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Abstract
With an increasing number of replication studies performed in psychological
science, the question of how to evaluate the outcome of a replication attempt
deserves careful consideration. Bayesian approaches allow to incorporate un-
certainty and prior information into the analysis of the replication attempt by
their design. The Replication Bayes factor, introduced by Verhagen and Wa-
genmakers (2014), provides quantitative, relative evidence in favor or against a
successful replication. In previous work by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014)
it was limited to the case of t-tests. In this paper, the Replication Bayes factor
is extended to F -tests in multi-group, fixed-effect ANOVA designs. Simulations
and examples are presented to facilitate the understanding and to demonstrate
the usefulness of this approach. Finally, the Replication Bayes factor is com-
pared to other Bayesian and frequentist approaches and discussed in the context
of replication attempts. R code to calculate Replication Bayes factors and to
reproduce the examples in the paper is available at https://osf.io/jv39h/.
1 Introduction
The ”replication crisis” (Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012; Asendorpf et al.,
2013) has been a focus of discussion in psychological science in recent years.
There is ongoing debate about how to improve methodological rigor and sta-
tistical analysis in order to improve reliability and replicability of published
findings. When considering a given replication study, a central question is the
final evaluation, i.e. the question whether a previous finding has successfully
been replicated.
As with any scientific question in empirical disciplines, researchers use sta-
tistical tools in order to find an answer to this question. An intuitive way
to evaluate replication results is to compare statistical significance in both an
original study and a replication study (”vote counting”): If both studies are
significant and show effects in the same direction, the replication is deemed
”successful”. If, on the other hand, the original study reported a statistically
significant test which is non-significant in the replication study, the replication
might be considered ”failed”. This interpretation, while intuitive and common
practice in past research (Maxwell et al., 2015), is flawed in general and wrong
in the case of non-significant replications. A non-significant result cannot be
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interpreted as evidence for the absence of an effect – especially since the dif-
ference between a significant result in an original study and a non-significant
result in a replication study might not be significant in itself (Gelman and Stern,
2006). Moreover, statistical significance and p-values do not contain informa-
tion about uncertainty in estimates and their misinterpretations have repeatedly
been covered over the past decades (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016; Ionides et al.,
2017; Nickerson, 2000; Bakan, 1966). A related question is whether the strict
dichotomy between ”successful” and ”failed” replications is sensible in practice.
To overcome problems with simply comparing p-values based on their sig-
nificance, other methods for evaluating replication studies have been proposed,
partly also alleviating the strict dichotomy: confidence intervals (CI) for effect
size estimates have been advocated by some authors for both the reporting of
statistical summaries (Cumming and Finch, 2001; Cumming, 2012) and for the
evaluation of replications (Cumming, 2008; Gilbert et al., 2016, but see also
Anderson et al., 2016). A researcher could, for example, check if the effect size
estimate from a replication study falls within the 95% confidence interval of the
effect size estimate from the original study – or, vice versa, check if the effect
size estimate from the original study falls within the 95% confidence interval of
the replication study. While this approach takes uncertainty into account (in
contrast to p-values), confidence intervals can be difficult to interpret and give
rise to misinterpretations (Belia et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2016).
The width of a confidence interval is directly related to sample size and
thus to the power curve of a statistical test. Since power is notoriously low
in psychological science (Button et al., 2013; Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 1989;
Szucs and Ioannidis, 2017), confidence intervals tend to be generally wide for
original studies from the published literature (Morey and Lakens, 2016). This
can make a sensible comparison of confidence intervals difficult and lead to
inconclusive or misleading results (depending on the particular decision rule).
Simonsohn (2015) therefore proposed a method to take the power of the original
study into account when evaluating a replication study. In his ”small telescopes”
approach, the confidence interval of a replication study is compared not to the
effect size estimate from the original study, but to an effect the original study
had 33% power to detect. The benchmark of 33% is arbitrary, but Simonsohn
(2015) considers it a ”small effect”. The goal is to determine if a replication
study, yielding a smaller effect size than in the original study, is still in line
with a small effect that the original study had only little power to detect. This
allows for a more nuanced interpretation of a replication outcome than simply
comparing p-values or confidence intervals.
The approaches outlined so far rely on a frequentist interpretation of prob-
ability and data analysis. Frequentist statistics is primarily concerned with
repeated sampling and long-run rates of events. It does not allow a researcher
to answer questions such as ”How much more should I believe in an effect?” or
”Given the data, what are the most credible effect size estimates?”. Bayesian
statistics allows to address such questions in a coherent framework and uses
uncertainty in estimates as an integral part of the analysis.
Related to the analysis of a replication study, various Bayesian approaches
are possible. Marsman et al. (2017), for example, have evaluated the results
from the ”Reproducibility Project: Psychology” (Open Science Collaboration,
2015) using several methods, including Bayesian parameter estimation on the
individual study level, Bayesian meta-analysis, and Bayes factors. For psychol-
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ogy in particular, Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Jeffreys, 1961) have
repeatedly been proposed as an alternative or addition to significance testing
in common study scenarios (see Morey et al., 2016, or Bayarri et al., 2015, for
introductions to Bayesian hypothesis testing).
Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) compared several Bayes factors to be
used in the context of replication studies and introduced a Bayes factor to
specifically investigate the outcome of a replication study, which they termed
Replication Bayes factor. It is constructed to be used only with reported test-
statistics from an original study and a replication study. As some researchers
disagree with the notion of ”belief” in data-analysis, it is also a favorable prop-
erty of the Replication Bayes factor that it makes only little assumptions about
prior beliefs. The Replication Bayes factor allows to test the hypothesis that
the effect in a replication study is in line with an original study against the
hypothesis that there is no effect. The result is a continuous quantification of
relative evidence (Morey et al., 2016), showing by much the data are more in
line with one hypothesis compared to the other.
The present article focuses on the Bayesian perspective and extends the
Replication Bayes factor. Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) introduced the
Replication Bayes factor solely for the case of one- and two-sample t-tests. In
this paper, it will be extended to the case of F -tests in fixed-effect ANOVA
designs, a common study design in cognitive, social, and other sub-fields of
psychology. In order to do so, an outline of hypothesis testing using Bayes factors
and how it can be applied to replication studies is presented. In the second
section, it is shown how the Replication Bayes factor can be used in studies
investigating difference between several groups, when fixed-effect ANOVAs are
carried out. Simulations and example studies are then followed by a general
discussion of the method.
In general, it has been recommended (Brandt et al., 2014; Anderson and
Maxwell, 2016) that replicators should include different methods to evaluate
the outcome of a replication study to account for the advantages, limitations,
and varying statistical questions the different approaches present. This allows
for a more nuanced interpretation of replication studies than a simple compar-
ison of statistical significance. The Replication Bayes factor is hence presented
as an addition to existing methods of analyzing the outcome of a replication
study. The article aims to provide an accessible introduction in the setup of
the Replication Bayes factors, but assumes a general understanding of Bayesian
statistics – in particular with the general concepts of priors, marginal likeli-
hoods, and Bayesian belief updating. Readers unfamiliar with the Bayesian
approach might find the excellent textbooks by McElreath (2016) and Kruschke
(2015) helpful. A reading list of relevant introductory papers is given by Etz
et al. (2018). Rouder et al. (2012) and Morey et al. (2016) have elaborated
specifically on the use of Bayes factors.
To reproduce the examples in this article, all scripts are available in an
OSF repository at https://osf.io/jv39h/ (Harms, 2018). To calculate the
Replication Bayes factor for t-tests (Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014) and F -
tests (the present article), an R-Package is available at https://github.com/
neurotroph/ReplicationBF.
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2 Bayesian Hypothesis Testing
While Bayes’ theorem allows several interpretations, Bayes factors are best un-
derstood in the context of Bayesian belief updating. Bayes factors indicate how
to rationally shift beliefs in two competing hypotheses (formalized as models
M0 and M1) based on the observed data Y :
P (M0|Y )
P (M1|Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior Odds
=
pi(M0)
pi(M1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior Odds
× P (Y |M0)
P (Y |M1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor
(1)
The Bayes factor BF01 =
P (Y |M0)
P (Y |M1) is the factor by which the prior odds
are multiplied in order to get updated posterior odds (Jeffreys, 1961; Lindley,
1993; Kass and Raftery, 1995). It is a ratio of the marginal likelihoods or model
evidence of the two models, which is given by
P (Y |Mi) =
∫
p(Y |θ,Mi)pi(θ|Mi) dθ (2)
where θ is the vector of model parameters, pi(θ|Mi) is the prior distribution
for the parameters in Model Mi and p(Y |θ,Mi) is the likelihood function of
Mi. The marginal likelihood is the normalizing constant in Bayes’ rule in order
for the posterior to be a proper probability distribution. Hence, the integrand
consists of the same parts as the nominator in Bayes’ rule, namely likelihood
and prior.
The challenge of computing Bayes factors lies in the possible complexity of
the integral. As will be explained in more detail later, in many practical cases
– such as in the case for the Replication Bayes factor – the marginal likelihood
needs to be approximated, for example by using Monte Carlo methods.
Bayes factors provide relative evidence for one model when compared to
another model and they can – in contrast to p-values in the Neyman-Pearson
framework of null-hypothesis significance testing – be interpreted directly in a
continuous, quantitative manner. To facilitate verbal interpretation, Jeffreys
(1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995) provided guidelines for the description
of Bayes factors: A BF10 is ”not worth more than a bare mention” if it is
between 1 (the data provide evidence for both models equally) and about 3;
the evidence against model M0 is ”substantial” if 3 < BF10 ≤ 10, ”strong” if
10 < BF10 ≤ 100 and ”decisive” if BF10 > 100.
In recent years it has become increasingly popular to report Bayes factors as
an addition or alternative to traditional null-hypothesis significance testing using
p-values. Calculations and tools for common scenarios in psychological research
exist (e.g. Rouder et al., 2012; Rouder and Morey, 2012; Rouder et al., 2009;
Dienes, 2016). In the context of replications, Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016)
have used Bayes factors to show that the original studies in the ”Reproducibility
Project: Psychology” (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) have provided only
little relative evidence against the null hypothesis (when taking into account
publication bias). Replication studies yielding substantial in favor or against
the null hypothesis were mostly studies with larger sample sizes. The analysis
is an example how Bayes factors could be used to provide more insights into the
results of empirical studies.
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To summarize, the Bayesian frameworks allows a researcher to incorporate
existing, previous knowledge into the statistical analysis. This is particularly
useful in the context of replication studies: An original experiment has provided
information about an effect and if one wants to evaluate a replication study, the
information from the original should be considered. The Replication Bayes
factor formalizes this and tests the hypothesis of a successful replication against
the hypothesis of a null effect.
2.1 Bayes factors for Replications
The Replication Bayes factor introduced by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014)
is a way to use the Bayesian hypothesis testing framework in the context of
replications and to quantify the outcome of a replication attempt given the
information from the original study. The general idea is to use the posterior
from the original study as a prior for the analysis of the replication attempt –
in line with the idea of updating beliefs as outlined above. Furthermore, it is
desirable to only use data that is easily available from published studies. Thus,
ideally, only reported test-statistics with degrees of freedom and sample size are
used.
For a Bayesian hypothesis test, two models need to be set up and compared
in the Bayes factor. For the Replication Bayes factor these two models or
hypotheses about an effect size measure δ are:
1. H0 : δ = 0, that is the hypothesis that the true effect size is zero (the
”skeptic’s position” in the terms of Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014).
2. Hr : δ ≈ δorig, i.e. the hypothesis that the original study is a good estimate
of the true effect size (the ”proponent’s position”).
The Replication Bayes factor is then the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of
the two models considering the data from the replication study, denoted by Yrep
(Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014, p. 1461):
Br0 =
p(Yrep|Hr)
p(Yrep|H0) (3)
That is, the Replication Bayes factor represents the relative evidence of the
data in favor of a successful replication when compared to a null hypothesis of
no effect. ”Successful” here means, that the replication yields a similar effect
size as the original study. This implies an assumption about the validity of the
effect size estimate of the original study, which is also discussed later in this
paper.
In order to calculate Br0 one needs to mathematically define the two models
and find a useful representation of the data from the original study (Yorig) and
the replication study (Yrep). While the data would ideally be the raw data and
used to fit a probabilistic model describing the relationship between independent
and dependent variables, for the Replication Bayes factor it is desired to rely on
more accessible data. In the case of (published) replication studies often only
summary and test statistics are reported. Thus, for the evaluation of replication
studies it is desirable to be able to calculate the Replication Bayes factor based
on the reported test statistics (with degrees of freedom and sample sizes) from
the original study and the replication study alone.
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2.2 Replication Bayes factor for t-tests
In their paper, Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) provided models and for-
mulas for the computation of the Replication Bayes factor for t-tests. In the
following section, the rationale and the setup of the model will be reiterated as
a basis for the extension to F -tests.
The general model is based on the t-distribution used for the t-test and
derives from the distribution of t-values under the alternative hypothesis. The
marginal likelihood for the two models that are compared is given
p(Yrep|Hi) =
∫
t
dfrep,δ
√
Nrep
(trep)pi(δ|Hi) dδ (4)
with tdf,∆(x) being the non-central t-distribution with df degrees of freedom
and non-centrality parameter ∆ = δ
√
Nrep.
The two models under consideration differ in their prior distributions pi(δ|Hi):
For the skeptic (H0), the prior distribution is 1 at δ = 0 and 0 everywhere else.
Thus, the marginal likelihood simplifies to
p(Yrep|H0) = tdfrep(trep) (5)
Which is the central t-distribution (i.e. non-central t-distribution with non-
centrality parameter ∆ = 0) evaluated at the point of the t-value observed in
the replication study, trep.
For the proponent on the other hand, the prior distribution for the replica-
tion, pi(δ|Hr), is the posterior distribution of the original study. If one starts
out with a flat, uninformative prior before the original experiment, the result-
ing posterior distribution was described as Λ′-distribution by Lecoutre (1999).
While in Bayesian statistics flat priors are often disregarded in favor of at least
minimally regularizing priors (Gelman et al., 2013), in the present case the prior
for the original study plays a minor rule: It is quickly overruled by the data
even when considering only a single original study. For the Replication Bayes
factor, only the posterior of the original study is relevant. The Λ′-distribution
can be approximated closely through a normal distribution as Verhagen and
Wagenmakers (2014) showed in their appendix. If the prior for the replica-
tion, pi(δ|Hr), is expressed through the posterior of the original study, so that
pi(δ|Hr) = p(δ|δorig, Hr), the marginal likelihood for the proponent’s model is
finally given as
p(Yrep|Hr) =
∫
t
dfrep,δ
√
Nrep
(trep)p(δ|δorig, Hr) dδ (6)
For the integral no closed form is yet known. Hence, it needs to be approx-
imated and different methods exist. Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) used
the Monte Carlo estimate (Gamerman and Lopes, 2006, chap. 7.2.1): random
samples from the posterior-turned-prior distribution, p(δ|δorig, Hr), are repeat-
edly drawn and the average of the marginal likelihood term is calculated. Other
approaches to approximating the marginal likelihood for the Bayes factor are
available and will be discussed below.
Putting Equations 5 and 6 into Equation 3 yields the formula for the Repli-
cation Bayes factor for t-tests:
Br0 =
∫
t
dfrep,δ
√
Nrep
(trep)p(δ|δorig, Hr) dδ
tdfrep(trep)
(7)
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In their paper, Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) used simulation studies
and examples to demonstrate the usefulness of the Replication Bayes factor,
and show how it compares to other Bayes factors that might also be used for
replication studies.
3 Replication Bayes factor for F -tests
Many studies in psychological research do not compare two independent groups
through t-tests, but investigate differences across multiple groups and interac-
tions between factors. Thus, there seems to be a need to extend this approach
to other tests such as the F -test in ANOVAs. In this section the steps necessary
to apply the Replication Bayes factor to other tests are explained, and the Bayes
factor is derived for the F -test in fixed-effect ANOVA designs.
As a general difference to the t-test, F -tests do not convey information about
the direction or location of an effect; the hypothesis under investigation is an
omnibus hypothesis if the effect degrees of freedom are dfeffect > 1 (Rosenthal
et al., 2000; Steiger, 2004). Therefore incorporating the F -statistic in the Repli-
cation Bayes factor does not allow researchers to take the direction of the effect
into account. As will be shown in Example 3 and discussed later, researchers
need to consider additional information when evaluating the outcome of repli-
cation studies with ANOVA designs. Nevertheless, researchers use and report
F -tests both for omnibus and interaction hypotheses. And the F -statistic does
contain information about the effect size. Thus the F -statistic can be used in
the Replication Bayes factor if a statement about the size of an effect is desired.
In order to maintain the general nature of the Replication Bayes factor from
Equation 3, an effect size measure needs to be chosen to parametrise the model.
Cohen’s f2 (Cohen, 1988) has a simple relationship to the non-centrality pa-
rameter λ of the non-central F -distribution (Steiger, 2004):
λ = f2 ·N
Since this relationship holds only in the case of fixed-effects models, the Repli-
cation Bayes factor for F -tests can also only be used validly in these cases – a
limitation that will also be discussed later.
Setting up the model based on the F -distribution in a way similar to the
t-test case (cf. Equation 4) leads to the marginal likelihoods
p(Yrep|Hi) =
∫
Fdfeffect,dferror,λ(Frep)pi(f
2|Hi) df2 (8)
Where Fdfeffect,dferror,λ(x) is the noncentral F -distribution with degrees of free-
dom dfeffect and dferror and noncentrality parameter λ.
For the skeptic’s position, H0, the marginal likelihood simplifies – analogous
to the t-test case – to the central F -distribution evaluated at the observed F -
value from the replication study, since the prior pi(f2|H0) is chosen so that it is
1 at f2 = 0 and 0 everywhere else:
p(Yrep|H0) = Fdfeffect,dferror(Frep) (9)
For the Hr model on the other hand, the prior pi(f
2|Hr) should again be
the posterior of the original study. Starting out with a uniform prior before
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the original study results in the following posterior distribution for the original
study:
p(f2|Yorig) =
Fdfeffect,orig,dferror,orig,f2·Norig(Forig)∫
Fdfeffect,orig,dferror,orig,f2·Norig(Forig) df2
(10)
Lecoutre (1999) called this distribution Λ2-distribution, similar to the Λ′-distribution
for t-tests. In contrast, this distribution cannot be easily approximated by a
normal distribution (see shape of distribution in Figure 1). Despite the use
of an improper prior, the posterior distribution is valid as all parameters are
actually observed in the original study, i.e., dfeffect,orig, dferror,orig, Forig > 0 and
Norig  1.
The Replication Bayes factor for F -tests is then given by
Br0 =
∫
Fdfeffect,dferror,f2·N (Frep)p(f
2|Yorig) df2
Fdfeffect,dferror(Frep)
(11)
The challenge to compute the Replication Bayes factor lies primarily in the
calculation of the integral of the numerator. Marginal likelihoods in general
are often difficult to compute or intractable and analytical solutions are rarely
available in applied settings. Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) chose the
Monte Carlo estimator (Gamerman and Lopes, 2006, p. 239). For the Monte
Carlo estimate samples are randomly drawn from the prior distribution of the
Hr model, i.e. from the original study’s posterior distribution p(f
2|Yorig), the
integrand is calculated and the marginal likelihood is approximated by taking
the average.
Br0 ≈ 1
M
M∑
i
Fdfeffect,dferror,f2(i)·Nrep(Frep)
Fdfeffect,dferror(Frep)
, f2(i) ∼ p(f2|Yorig) (12)
The Monte Carlo estimate, however, is inefficient and unstable, especially
when prior and likelihood disagree (i.e. when the original and the replication
study yield very different effect size estimates). There are other estimators for
the marginal likelihood available. Gamerman and Lopes (2006, chap. 7) pro-
vide an overview on twelve different estimators. Bos (2002) compared seven
estimators in simulations and showed, that the Monte Carlo estimate is highly
unstable and often yields values very different from an analytically derived solu-
tion. Numerical integration can work well in low-dimensional settings, but does
not scale to problems involving multiple parameters or wide ranges of possible
parameter values.
For complex models, bridge sampling provides a stable and efficient way to
estimate the marginal likelihood (Meng and Wing, 1996; Gronau et al., 2017).
Since the present case involves only a single parameter and relatively simple
likelihood function and posterior distribution, importance sampling is a faster,
but also efficient and stable way to estimate the marginal likelihood.
The importance sampling estimate for the marginal likelihood (Gamerman
and Lopes, 2006, chap. 7) is calculated by drawing M random samples from an
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Figure 1: Plot of posterior distribution for a study with an observed f2 =
0.625 in an one-way ANOVA with two groups and 10 participants each, i.e. 20
participants in total, yielding F (1, 8) = 5.0. The grey line represents the half-
normal importance density g(f2), which is constructed based on samples from
the posterior distribution generated by Metropolis-Hastings, used for estimating
the marginal likelihood.
importance density g(f2) and averaging an adjusted likelihood term:
p(Yrep|Hr) ≈ 1
M
M∑
i
p(Yrep|f˜2i )pi(f˜2i )
g(f˜2i )
≈ 1
M
M∑
i
p(Yrep|f˜2i )p(f˜2i |Yorig)
g(f˜2i )
, (13)
f˜2i ∼ g(f2)
Since the prior for Hr is the posterior distribution given in Equation 10, the
marginal likelihood p(Yorig|Hr) for the original study also needs to be computed
in order for p(f2|Yorig) to be a proper probability density and the estimator to
yield correct results.
How should the importance density g(f2) be chosen? A simple and straight
forward way is to use a half-normal distribution with mean and standard devi-
ation determined by samples from the posterior. The half-normal distribution
is easy for drawing random samples and can easily be calculated at any point.
While it is not as close to the true posterior (see Figure 1) as in the t-test case,
it is sufficient for the purpose of importance sampling since the tails of the half-
normal distribution are fatter than the non-normalized posterior density (see
requirements for importance densities listed in Gronau et al., 2017).
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To sample from the unknown and yet non-normalized posterior-distribution
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques can be used, e.g. the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm (Chib and Greenberg, 1995). In Bayesian statistics approx-
imating the posterior distribution is one of the core challenges and thus sev-
eral implementations for different algorithms are available. Metropolis-Hastings
yields samples from a target distribution by taking a random walk through the
parameter space. An accessible introduction is given in McElreath (2016, chap.
8) and a more mathematical description can be found in Gelman et al. (2013,
chap. 11.2). Software packages such as JAGS or Stan (Gelman et al., 2015)
are commonly used to draw samples from the posterior distribution of Bayesian
models.
The mean and standard deviation of the posterior samples are then used to
construct a half-normal distribution as importance density g(f2). Subsequently,
random samples from the importance density are used to estimate the marginal
likelihood according to Equation 13, especially in regions where the posterior
distribution has high probability mass, resulting in a better estimate compared
to the Monte Carlo estimate.
For the case of the Replication Bayes factor it will be shown below in simu-
lations, that the differences between the estimates are small except in the most
extreme cases. Since it is nonetheless desirable to have accurate and robust
estimates, in the remainder of the article the Importance Sampling estimate is
used.
Dividing the resulting estimate for the marginal likelihood of Hr by the H0
model evidence (Equation 11) allows the calculation of the Replication Bayes
factor:
Br0 =
∫
Fdfeffect,dferror,f2×N (Frep)p(f
2|Yorig) df2
Fdfeffect,dferror(Frep)
(14)
The resulting Bayes factor can then be interpreted based on its quantitative
value: Br0 > 1 is evidence in favor of the proponent’s hypothesis, i.e. evidence in
favor of a true effect of a similar size, while a Br0 < 1 is evidence against a true
effect of similar size. The more the Bayes factor deviates from 1, the stronger
the evidence. It might be helpful to use the commonly used boundaries of 3 and
1
3 for sufficient evidence:
1
3 < Br0 < 3 is weak evidence for either hypothesis
(Jeffreys, 1961, p. 432) and should lead the researcher to collect further data to
strengthen the evidence (Scho¨nbrodt et al., 2015; Edwards et al., 1963).
The provided R-package contains functions to calculate Replication Bayes
factors for both t- and F -tests using the formulas provided here, relying on
importance sampling to estimate marginal likelihoods.
4 Simulation Studies
In order to show properties of the Replication Bayes factors, three simulation
studies are presented. First, the numerical results in different scenarios are
shown to allow comparisons across different study designs and effect sizes. Sec-
ond, the Monte Carlo estimate and the Importance Sampling estimate for the
marginal likelihood are compared. While the differences are small except for
the most extreme cases, it is argued that the more robust method is to be
10
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Figure 2: Value of the Replication Bayes factor for F -tests in various scenarios.
Columns show sample sizes per group in original and replication study, rows are
f2 effect sizes in the original study. Horizontal axes in each plot show f2 effect
size in replication study and vertical axes are log10-scaled showing Br0. Shades
of grey denote number of groups. Each point is one calculated Replication
Bayes factor in a given scenario. Vertical black lines indicate the effect size in
the original study, i.e. points on this line are replication studies where the effect
size equals the original study. Horizontal dashed line is Br0 = 1.
preferred. Last, the relationship between t- and F -values in studies of two inde-
pendent groups is used to compare the Replication Bayes factor for t-tests with
the proposed adaptation to the F -test.
4.1 Simulation 1: Behavior in Different Scenarios
To better understand the Replication Bayes factor, it is useful to explore dif-
ferent scenarios in which a researcher might calculate it. For Figure 2, different
combinations for original and replication studies were considered. In particular,
one can see that the Replication Bayes factor increases towards support for the
proponent’s position when the replication has large sample size and yields a
large effect size estimate.
For situations in which the effect size estimate is very small in both the
original and the replication study, the Replication Bayes factor is close to 1. In
these cases, the proponent’s and the skeptic’s position are very similar and even
100 participants per group are not enough to properly distinguish between the
two models (see left most points in first row plots of Figure 2). If, in contrast, the
original study reported a relatively large effect and the replication study yields
a small effect, the Replication Bayes factor quantifies this correctly as evidence
in favor of the skeptic’s positions. Moreover, the considered setup shows that –
holding group sizes equal – more groups allow stronger conclusions since total
sample size is higher.
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4.2 Simulation 2: Monte Carlo vs Importance Sampling
Estimate
The aforementioned difference between the Monte Carlo estimate for the marginal
likelihood and an importance sampling estimate is especially relevant if prior
and likelihood of a model disagree substantially. For the Replication Bayes fac-
tor this is the case when original study and replication study yield very different
effect size estimates.
As referenced above, Bos (2002) has shown in simulations that the Monte
Carlo estimate is generally unstable and leads to biased estimates of the marginal
likelihood. He compared the results both against the analytical solution and
other estimators, which performed substantially better.
In order to evaluate how this affects the Replication Bayes factor, pairs of
studies are investigated. For illustrative purposes, original studies with norig =
15 per group with an observed effect size of dorig ∈ {1; 2; 5} and subsequent
replications with sample sizes nrep ∈ {50; 100} per group and observed effect
sizes drep ∈ {0; 0.3; 0.5} are entered in the Replication Bayes factor for t-tests.
The resulting Bayes factor is estimated using the Monte Carlo estimate and the
Importance Sampling estimate.
As can be seen from the results in Figure 3, the Monte Carlo estimate is
generally close to identical to the importance sampling estimate. It is only in
extreme cases that there are differences. For example, when an original study
yields d = 5 in a small sample of n = 15 per group and a replication shows only
a tiny or even a null effect in a much larger sample. The effect size of d = 5 is,
however, an implausibly large effect size for most empirical research fields. Even
when considering the larger sampling error in small samples, effect sizes around
d = 1 are already considered a ”large effect” in social sciences (Cohen, 1988) –
effects of d > 3 do not realistically appear in the literature in psychology.
While the differences can become large in orders of magnitude, in these cases
the Replication Bayes factor is also large in general because of the disagreement
between original and replication study. Thus, the conclusions are not changed
by the difference between estimates. Furthermore, in the practical examples
reported below the differences between the two estimates are numerically very
small and would not yield different conclusions.
Nevertheless, it should be desirable to provide an accurate estimates of a
statistical indicator to make an informed judgement, e.g. about the relative
evidence a replication study can provide. The Importance Sampling estimate
has been shown to be more stable and more accurate and is thus preferable
to the Monte Carlo estimate (Bos, 2002; Gronau et al., 2017; Gamerman and
Lopes, 2006).
4.3 Simulation 3: F -test for two groups
In the context of significance testing, it is a well known relationship that the
F -tests from a one-way ANOVA with two groups yield the same p-values as a
two-sided, two-sample t-test, when F = t2 is used. Accordingly, it might be
an interesting question, how the Replication Bayes factor for F -tests relates to
the Replication Bayes factor for t-tests when used on the same data from two
independent groups.
For pairs of original and replication studies with two groups of different
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Figure 3: Comparison for Replication Bayes factors (t-test) with marginal likeli-
hoods estimated by either Monte Carlo estimation (x-axis) or Importance Sam-
pling estimation (y-axis). Points are individual Bayes factors. Grey dashed line
indicates equality between both estimation methods. Only for extreme cases
(i.e. dorig = 0.5 and drep > 2) the estimations yield substantially different
results, but conclusions would remain the same. Original studies always had
norig = 15.
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sizes (norig ∈ {15; 50}, nrep ∈ {15; 30; 50; 100}) and different effect sizes (dorig ∈
{0.2; 0.4; 0.6; 0.8; 1; 2}, drep ∈ {1/105 ; 0.2; 0.4; 0.6; 0.8; 1; 2}), the Replication Bayes
factor for t-test was calculated using the observed t-value and for the F -test us-
ing F = t2.
The results are shown in Figure 4. As can be expected, the resulting Bayes
factors are very close (r = 0.999 across all scenarios). What cannot easily be
seen in the figure, however, is that the Replication Bayes factor for the F -test is
about half the size of the Replication Bayes factor for the t-test (
Br0,t
Br0,F
= 2.211).
This result makes intuitively sense: The F -statistic does not contain in-
formation about the direction of the effect and thus cannot provide the same
amount of relative evidence as a Bayes factor on the t-test.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Replication Bayes factors for t- and F -test on the
same data-set with two groups. Study pairs with replication studies smaller
than original studies were not simulated. Dashed grey line is equality.
5 Examples
In this section, the Replication Bayes factor for F -tests is applied in two exam-
ple cases of replication studies from the ”Reproducibility Project: Psychology”
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The third example presented in this section
aims to show how to investigate the pattern of effects to ensure valid conclusions
based on a high value of the Replication Bayes factor.
5.1 Example 1
The first example is an original study conducted by Albarrac´ın et al. (2008),
which was replicated as part of the ”Reproducibility Project: Psychology”
14
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015) by Voracek and Sonnleitner (2016) and is
available at https://osf.io/tarp4/.
Albarrac´ın et al. (2008) investigated the effect ”action” and ”inaction goals”
on subsequent ”motor or cognitive output”. In study 7 specifically, participants
were primed with either words relating to ”action”, ”inaction” or neutral words
(control condition). Participants subsequently engaged in either an active or
inactive task before they were instructed to read a text and write down their
thoughts about the text. The number of listed thoughts was used as a measure
for ”cognitive activity”. The experiment thus had a 3 (Prime: action, inaction,
control) × 2 (Task: active, inactive) between-subjects design.
Participants were predicted to write down more thoughts about the text
when they are primed with an ”action” goal compared to participants primed
with an ”inaction” goal. Futhermore, the possibility to exert activity in an active
task, should moderate the effect: ”satisfied action goals should yield less activity
than would unsatisfied action goals”. They found the two-way interaction Prime
× Task to be significant (F (2, 92) = 4.36, p = .02, η2p = 0.087 corresponding
to f2 = 0.095) in a sample of 98 student participants (group sizes were not
reported).
The replication by Sonnleitner and Voracek did not find the same interaction
to be significant in their sample of 105 participants, F (2, 99) = 2.532, p = .085,
η2p = 0.049, f
2 = 0.051.
Comparing the replication attempt to the original study using the Repli-
cation Bayes factor assuming equally sized groups yields Br0 = 1.153, which
can be considered inconclusive as the data are nearly equally likely under both
models. Based on the p-values, it was concluded that the study was not success-
fully replicated. Judging from the Bayes factor, however, it should be concluded
that the replication study did not have enough participants to indicate stronger
evidence in either direction. Considering the power of a frequentist test, recent
recommendations suggest at least 2.5 times as many participants than in the
original study one seeks to replicate (Simonsohn, 2015). The Replication Bayes
factor thus shows absence of evidence rather than evidence of absence of a failed
or successful replication.
For the main effect of Task, in contrast, which also was significant in the
original study (F (1, 92) = 7.57, p = .007, η2p = 0.076, f
2 = 0.082) but not
in the replication (F (1, 99) = .107, p = .745, η2p ≈ f2 < .001), the Replication
Bayes factor yields strong evidence in favor of the skeptic’s model (Br0 = 0.057).
This is evidence in favor of an unsuccessful replication of the main effect, since
the Bayes factor shows that the data are 17 times more likely under the model
implying an effect size f2 = 0 than under the model informed by the original
study. It should be noted however, that this does not answer the question
whether the replication is in line with an existing albeit smaller effect (which
the replication also did not have sufficient power to detect, see Simonsohn, 2015).
5.2 Example 2
For the second example another replication from the ”Reproducibility Project”
is considered: The original study was conducted by Williams and Bargh (2008)
and investigated cues of ”spatial distance on affect and evaluation”. The repli-
cation was performed by Joy-Gaba et al. (2016). The replication data, materials
and final report are available at https://osf.io/vnsqg/.
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In study 4 of the original paper, Williams and Bargh (2008) have primed 84
participants in three different conditions. The number of participants per group
was not reported. The authors hypothesized that different primes for spatial
distance will effect evaluations of perceived ”closeness” to siblings, parents and
hometown. The dependent variable was an index of ratings to those three
evaluations. Hence, the study was a between-subjects design with one factor
(Prime: Closeness, Intermediate, Distance). They found a significant main
effect of priming on the ”index of emotional attachment to one’s nuclear family
and hometown” in a one-way ANOVA (F (2, 81) = 4.97, p = .009, η2p = .11,
f2 = .124).
The replication by Joy-Gaba, Clay and Cleary did not find the same main
effect in a sample of 125 participants (F (2, 122) = .24, p = .79, η2p = .003919,
f2 = .00393). Based on the p-values they concluded, that the replication was
not successful.
But how much more are the data in line with a null model when compared
to the proponent’s alternative? This is the answer the Replication Bayes factor
can give, assuming equal group sizes: Br0 = 0.031. This means, the data is
about 32 times more likely under the model stating that the true effect size is
0 than under the model using the original study’s posterior.
5.3 Example 3
The final example aims to show a caveat when using the Replication Bayes factor
for F -tests yielding strong support for the proponent’s model. As has been
addressed above and could be seen in the last simulation, the F -statistic (and,
consequently, the f2 effect size measure) does not convey information about the
location or direction of an effect. This is a general problem when evaluating
the outcomes from ANOVA-design studies based on the test-statistic alone.
Researchers need additional judgments based on post-hoc t-tests or qualitative
consideration of interaction plots.
In order to show how to inspect the results thoroughly, an imaginary study
is conducted: In an original study, 15 participants each are randomly assigned
to three different conditions (45 participants in total). The true population
means of the three groups are µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 2.2 and µ3 = 2.9 and standard
deviation is 1 for all groups. Running a one-way ANOVA on a generated data-
set yields a significant result, F (2, 42) = 7.91, p = .001, f2 = 0.377. For
the replication study, 30 participants are randomly sampled to the same three
conditions each (thus 90 participants in total). For the generated replication
data-set the ANOVA yields a significant result as well, F (2, 87) = 7.60, p < .001,
f2 = 0.175.
The test-statistics and effect size estimates show a significant effect in both
studies. Did the replication happen to successfully replicate the original finding?
Before calculating the Replication Bayes factor, one should inspect the data in
more detail. Considering the the plot in Figure 5, it is obvious that the pattern
of effects is strikingly different. In fact, the replication shows the reverse pattern.
Since the F -statistic is insensitive to this difference, the Replication Bayes factor
does not provide us this information. Yet, it does correctly indicate that the
data are more in favor of an effect in size – not direction – of the original study
(Br0 = 38.261).
Considering post-hoc t-tests or planned contrasts helps to include location
16
Original Replication
1 2 3 1 2 3
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Group
M
ea
n 
± 
2 
x 
St
an
da
rd
 E
rro
r
Figure 5: Summary plot for the imaginary study in Example 3. Original study
has 15 participants per group with population means µ = (1.5; 2.2; 2.9). Repli-
cation has 30 participants per group with population means in reverse order.
and direction of the effect in the analysis. For the present example, for example,
the difference between groups 1 and 3 is significant in both the original study
(t(20.809) = −3.953, p = .001) and the replication study (t(56.765) = 3.6412,
p < .001). The difference in direction is visible in the sign of the t-statistic
and thus the Replication Bayes factor for t-test can consider this information
(Br0 = 0.0015 or the reciprocal B0r = 668.15)
Consequently, researchers investigating F -tests should always pay attention
to the particular nature of the effect under investigation. This is a recommen-
dation not limited to the evaluation of replication studies, but is generally a
crucial step when analyzing data from ANOVA-studies.
6 Discussion
The Replication Bayes factor for F -tests in fixed-effect ANOVA designs outlined
in this paper is an extension of the work by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014).
It utilizes a Bayesian perspective on replications, namely using the results and
uncertainty from the original study in the analysis of a replication attempt. The
approach outlined in this paper adapts the Replication Bayes factor from t- to
F -tests.
In evaluating replication studies it is reasonable to use the information avail-
able from the original study. When p-values of two studies are directly compared
based on their significance, or when a confidence interval is used to examine
whether the effect size in the original can be rejected, this is already essentially
done. The Bayesian framework allows to do this in a more formal framework
and incorporates uncertainty in estimates. The latter is ignored when only p-
values are compared. This is one of the reasons why ”vote counting” is not
recommended when evaluating a replication study.
A general criticism of Bayesian hypothesis testing with Bayes factors is the
role of the prior. While proponents of Bayesian statistics generally consider in-
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corporating previous knowledge or expectation as a strength of Bayesian statis-
tics, the perceived subjectivity in its selection is troublesome for some non-
Bayesians. In contrast to other ways of including the results from the original
study in Bayesian model (see below), the Replication Bayes factor introduces
very little subjectivity to the analyses. The model for the Replication Bayes
factor is derived directly from the assumptions of null-hypothesis significance
testing.
While Bayes factors do not provide controls for error rates over many re-
peated samplings, they do allow for a quantification of relative model evidence.
That is, a Bayes factor allows statements such as ”the data are 5-times more
likely under the alternative model than under the null model”. Researchers
reluctant to the Bayesian approach in general might nevertheless find the Repli-
cation Bayes factor in particular a useful addition without adding too much
subjectivity. After all, the evaluation of replication studies should not rely
on a single method (Marsman et al., 2017; Brandt et al., 2014; Anderson and
Maxwell, 2016; Gilbert et al., 2016).
The steps taken and explained in this paper can also be used to apply the
Replication Bayes factor logic to other tests such as χ2-tests, z-tests, or correla-
tions (see also Boekel et al., 2015, Appendix). One needs to use the appropriate
test-statistic and sampling distribution under the alternative hypothesis and
accordingly derive the resulting marginal likelihoods. The use of Importance
Sampling for estimating the marginal likelihoods allows for more general cases
than the Monte Carlo estimate; on the one hand it is more robust to large
disagreements between original study and replication study (see Simulation 3)
and, on the other hand, scales better if more parameters were introduced in the
model.
6.1 Limitations
As explained above, Cohen’s f2 was chosen as the parameter of interest. This
limits the application of the proposed Replication Bayes factor for F -tests to
fixed-effects ANOVAs with approximately equal cell sizes. The relationship
between the non-centrality parameter λ and f2 is only valid in these cases.
In general, effect size measures in ANOVAs take into account the specific
effects (i.e. each cell mean’s deviation from the grand mean Steiger, 2004) and
cell sizes. In many reported ANOVAs, however, only the total sample size along
with the omnibus or interaction test is reported. Even if specific contrasts are of
interest, they are not reported with sample sizes or descriptive statistics required
to calculate the specific effects.
What happens when f2 is used in unbalanced designs? If a specific effect is
present in a group with larger sample size, f2 will overestimate the overall effect.
For studies with randomized allocation to the groups, the differences in cell sizes
should be small, so the assumption of balancedness seems warranted. In non-
random studies where unbalanced groups are to be expected, the Replication
Bayes factor as outlined here should not be used. More elaborate alternatives
as suggested below might be more appropriate.
The Replication Bayes factor is also limited by the information provided in
the F -statistic: Since the F -statistic (and consequently f2) does not convey in-
formation about the direction and location of the effect, the Replication Bayes
factor cannot take the pattern of effects into account. The Replication Bayes
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factor still does give the relative evidence regarding the size of the effect. As
shown in Example 3, one way is to follow-up evidence in favor of a replicated
effect by investigating the pattern in the post post-hoc t-tests or contrasts. If
no such tests are reported, one could use the Replication Bayes factor for the
omnibus test as a quantitative indicator and use visual inspection whether the
effect is indeed in the same direction. This is in parallel to the recommended
practice for analyzing data with ANOVAs. Another way of dealing with this
could be to extend the model used in the Replication Bayes factor to include
the descriptive statistics of all groups instead of the test-statistic. This, how-
ever, would require additional assumptions and does not follow as directly from
the significance tests as the method proposed here. The Bayesian alternatives
mentioned below can be a starting point for further extensions of the model.
What is true for p-values (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016) also holds true
for Bayes factors: No single statistical parameter will take the responsibility
from researchers to make a careful evaluation of the different statistical results
at hand. Even if all statistical parameters are in agreement, differences in
methodology and design might render the statistical comparison ad absurdum.
Last, effect size estimates are more difficult to compute for random- and
mixed-effects ANOVAs. While effect size measures such as ω2 can be calculated
in these scenarios, the relationship to the non-central F -distribution is not as
obvious. Further developments of the Replication Bayes factor might be useful
in this direction.
6.2 Alternatives to the Replication Bayes factor
The Replication Bayes factor is only one way to evaluate a replication study in
the Bayesian framework. As outlined above, its strength lies in making little
assumptions and the ability to use only reported test-statistic for the evaluation.
One alternative way to use Bayes factors would be to model the information
from the original study differently. Where the posterior of the original study is
used here as a prior in the replication model, one could also use the effect size
estimate and a reported confidence interval to construct a Normal distribution
as prior. Statistical software such as JASP (JASP Team, 2018) allows to use
different priors, including normal distributions, to calculate Bayes factors from
test-statistics.
Another way to use the Bayesian framework would be not to rely on Bayes
factors but use Bayesian estimation in hierarchical models and to incorporate
both the original and the replication study to estimate the effect size across both
studies. Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016) have used such models to evaluate the
outcomes of the ”Reproducibility Project: Psychology”. Some of the methods
outlined in this article can also be used for single study pairs.
Recently, Ly et al. (2017) have proposed a reconceptualization of the Repli-
cation Bayes factor. The goal is to avoid the computations for the posterior-
turned-prior distribution and instead rely on ”evidence updating”. Different
Bayes factors can be multiplied yielding the Replication Bayes factor BF10(drep|dorig)
(Ly et al., 2017, p. 7):
BF10(drep|dorig) = BF10(dorig, drep)
BF10(dorig)
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This requires the computation of a Bayes factor for the original study alone,
BF10(dorig), and a Bayes factor of a combined data set from both studies,
BF10(dorig, drep). In their pre-print, Ly et al. (2017) outline how to calculate
this Bayes factor from ”Evidence Updating” for t-tests and contingency tables.
The calculation of an F -value representing a combined data-set requires
reported means, standard deviations and group sizes for both the original and
replication study. These are not always reported and the Replication Bayes
factor outlined here is designed to not require it. Therefore the extension of the
original concept for the Replication Bayes factor (Verhagen and Wagenmakers,
2014) is useful when only limited data is available from a published article.
Last, the Replication Bayes factor uses the effect size estimate from the
original study at face value. This is in many cases a questionable assumption,
since publication bias and p-hacking are known to inflate effect size estimate in
the reported literature. For sample size planning it is relevant to account for this,
e.g. by planning a study at least about 2.5-times as large as the original study
(Simonsohn, 2015). For the analysis of a new replication study on an effect which
might not yet have been estimated through meta-analyses the comparison with
an originally reported effect size is useful and often the first step in an analysis.
The Replication Bayes factor can then answer the question: How much more
evidence in favor of an effect of this size does the data provide when compared
to a null effect? A Bayes factor using a manually (i.e. more subjectively) chosen
prior, as mentioned above, would be able to incorporate a corrected effect size.
By what factor or procedure one should correct a reported effect size is an open
question in meta-analytical research. Gelman (2014) has used the term ”Edlin
factor” for this: a measure by which published estimates should be correct by.
6.3 Conclusion
The Replication Bayes factor introduced by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014)
and extended herein is one index to evaluate the results of a replication attempt.
It is, obviously, not able to cover all questions and pitfalls in the analysis of a
replication. Instead it is a way to formally and transparently integrate previ-
ously available information in the analysis within the Bayesian framework and
allows to quantitatively assess the gained evidential value. It is further easy to
apply to frequentist results as it uses reported test statistics from the original
and replication study only. To cover replications comprehensively, however, re-
searchers have to use different tools depending on the question asked. No single
statistical index is sufficient to globally assess the quality of a study or a theory.
This is true not only for p-values (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016) but also for
Bayes factors.
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